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Article 
Semantic Descent: More Trouble for Civility 
ROBERT B. TALISSE 
Civility is widely regarded as a duty of democratic citizenship. This Article 
identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of developing an adequate 
conception of civility. Challenging the idea civility is the requirement to remain 
calm, peaceable, or dispassionate in political debate, it is argued that that civility 
is instead the requirement to address one’s political arguments to one’s 
interlocutors. In this way, civility is a second-order requirement, a norm 
governing our conduct in political disagreement. From there, a conceptual 
problem for civility so understood is raised, the problem of semantic descent. It is 
argued that any plausible conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” 
transformed into a partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as 
important as civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a 
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Semantic Descent: More Trouble for Civility 
ROBERT B. TALISSE * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly observed by commentators from across the political 
spectrum in the United States that the past decade has seen a marked 
intensification of political antagonism.1 Office holders and party officials 
seem to have lost the capacity to cooperate with those who do not share 
their political affiliation, resulting in political deadlock and stagnation.2 In 
fact, the trouble runs deeper than that. Whereas partisan animosity has long 
prevailed among politicians, it only recently has trickled down to, and 
intensified among, the U.S. citizenry.3 Citizens struggle these days to 
communicate productively across partisan divides. Thus, in addition to the 
intransigence within government, popular political discourse is beset by a 
range of dysfunctions that are commonly referred to collectively as 
incivility.4 A common thought is that we can begin to repair our democracy 
only by first restoring a commitment to civility. 
That incivility poses trouble for democracy is acknowledged by the 
American citizenry. A 2019 Pew study finds that most Americans believe 
that political debate has become dangerously toxic and disrespectful in 
recent years.5 A prior study finds that Americans disapprove of the 
incivility that has taken hold of democracy and want greater comity and 
cooperation among politicians.6 These findings offer some hope that the 
remedy for current political dysfunctions is not beyond reach. If citizens 
                                                                                                                     
* W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt 
University.  Thanks to Scott Aikin, Jody Azzouni, and Lisa Madura for comments on an earlier version 
of this Article. 
1 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 692 (2014).  
2 The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: Sharp Shifts Among Democrats on 
Aid to Needy, Race, Immigration, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.people-
press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/.  
3 Id. 
4 Kathleen Hall Jamieson et al., The Political Uses and Abuses of Civility and Incivility, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 205, 205–19 (Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson eds., 2017). 
5 Bruce Drake & Jocelyn Kiley, Americans Say the Nation’s Political Debate Has Grown More 
Toxic and ‘Heated’ Rhetoric Could Lead to Violence, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-
grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-violence/.   
6 See supra note 2.  
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dislike over-the-top political rancor and want a more civil mode of politics, 
then the challenge is simply that of incentivizing politicians and citizens to 
turn down the heat. 
Alas, this optimism fades in light of a further finding of the same 
study.7 Many who disapprove of the uncivil streak in contemporary U.S. 
politics also believe that the blame for incivility lies squarely with their 
political opponents; moreover, they think the solution is to force 
capitulation from the other side.8 In calling for more civility, many citizens 
seek submission or acquiescence from their political rivals. Surely civility 
cannot require capitulation from one’s political opposition. Something is 
amiss. 
The problem rests with the concept of civility itself. We all identify it 
as a political good, and incivility a political bad, yet we do not share a 
sufficiently nuanced understanding of what civility is. Similarly, we agree 
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil and are 
therefore blameworthy when they behave uncivilly; nonetheless, in the 
absence of a clearer account of what civility requires, the duty of civility 
lacks definite content. Finally, as it is popularly understood, civility is 
closely related to politeness, courtesy, and generosity; while satisfying 
these norms may be admirable, the duty of civility arguably involves 
something else, as it is not clear that citizens have a duty to be polite, 
courteous, or generous. In short, there is the conceptual work to be done. If 
incivility is to play a central diagnostic and prescriptive role in our analysis 
of current political dysfunctions, and if, as is commonly held, civility is to 
be understood as a duty of democratic citizenship, then we need to work 
from a suitably detailed conception of what civility is and why it is 
valuable. 
To anticipate a point that will feature in a later part of this Article, in 
pursuing this conceptual task, it is crucial that we develop a conception of 
civility that is itself nonpartisan. That is, in order to perform its prescriptive 
and diagnostic job, our understanding of civility must not be rigged in 
favor of our own favored political stances. Whatever civility is, it must be 
satisfiable by citizens from across the full spectrum of democratically valid 
political opinion.9 In other words, a conception of civility that renders out 
of bounds all advocacy for political positions that we oppose is no 
                                                                                                                     
7 Id. 
8 Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and 
Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), 
https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.  
9 This formulation leaves open the possibility that some political viewpoints are intrinsically 
uncivil, such that their expression is necessarily a violation of the duty of civility. Certain overtly racist, 
sexist, and nationalistic views can be plausibly regarded as uncivil. The point, which will be discussed 
further below, is that our conception of civility must allow for civil expressions of political viewpoints 
that we find erroneous, perhaps severely so. 
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conception of civility at all. We might say, then, that a proper conception 
of civility must itself be endorsable across the spectrum of democratically 
acceptable political perspectives. It must be in this sense public. 
This Article identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of 
developing a public conception of civility. I begin by raising a puzzle 
about civility as popularly understood, which in turn reveals that the duty 
of civility cannot be the requirement to remain calm, peaceable, or 
dispassionate in political debate. In fact, the initial puzzle suggests that 
civility cannot be a norm governing one’s tone or demeanor in political 
disputation at all. It will be proposed in Section Two that civility rather is a 
norm of discursive engagement that requires one to address one’s 
contributions to political argument to one’s interlocutors; civility is a norm 
of engagement, pertaining to how well one’s contributions to debate track 
the contributions of one’s interlocutors. It will then be argued, in Section 
Three, that whatever the more precise details of civility might be, the duty 
to be civil is a reciprocal requirement; that is, we are bound by the norm of 
civility only when there is sufficient reason to expect that one’s 
interlocutors will abide by it as well. In Section Four, I further specify 
conditions that a viable conception of civility must meet. In particular, I 
draw upon some terminology introduced by Willard Van Orman Quine to 
show that civility must be understood as a second-order norm, a norm 
governing our conduct in contexts of disagreement. In Section Five, I spell 
out a conceptual problem for civility so understood, what will be called the 
problem of semantic descent. It will be argued that any plausible 
conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” transformed into a 
partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as important as 
civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a diagnostic 
tool for repairing political dysfunctions is limited. 
I. THE PUZZLE OF CIVILITY 
Begin by assuming a popular conception of civility. According to it, 
civility involves remaining calm, reserved, cooperative, courteous, and 
dispassionate in political debate. This conception of civility has many 
merits, and perhaps chief among them is that it comports well with 
common usage of the term, including use in contexts outside of politics. 
Thus, in assuming the popular conception of civility, one is claiming that 
in politics one ought to abide by norms that govern other familiar 
discursive contexts where disputation might arise, from the family dinner 
table to the workplace, classroom, and queue at the supermarket. In short, 
the popular conception of civility in politics has the virtue of making 
civility a unitary concept, a set of norms applicable to interpersonal affairs 
across the board, as it were. 
Of course, the nastiness of politics may be regrettable without thereby 
being democratically pathological. Therefore, laments over the incivility of 
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contemporary politics are often accompanied by an additional (though 
often tacit) claim, namely that democratic citizens have a duty to be civil. 
This additional contention is needed if incivility is to be regarded as a 
democratic failure or political pathology. That is, in order for incivility to 
register as a democratic dysfunction, we need to make a case for thinking 
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil. 
The case for the duty of civility runs roughly as follows: If it is to 
flourish, a democracy needs to get things done; this means that political 
rivals—especially office holders, but citizens too—must cooperate and 
sometimes even compromise. When discourse is overly antagonistic, 
participants are incentivized to dig in their heels and adopt a stance of 
intransigence. This not only leads to deadlock, it also encourages a mode 
of politics that abandons the democratic ideal of self-government among 
equals, replacing it with a strictly strategic conception that values only 
winning and so regards political opponents as merely obstacles to be 
neutralized. Yet democracy is a partnership among political equals; thus, 
democratic citizens, including office holders, have a duty of civility.10 
Consequently, when they fail to be civil, citizens have fallen short of 
proper citizenship; and when incivility is rampant within a polity, 
democracy is failing. 
This reasoning is solid, but it occasions a puzzle. Understood as 
self-government among political equals, democracy calls upon citizens to 
take responsibility for their collective political life; they must in some 
sense take ownership of their political order. This means that citizens must 
be participants in the tasks of democracy. Accordingly, they have duties to 
be informed, competent, and reflective as citizens.11 In addition, they have 
a duty to exercise their judgment about public affairs. They are expected to 
think through the political issues of the day and to form their own political 
opinions. What is more, as citizens are one another’s equals, the style of 
judgment required by citizenship involves a kind of perspective-taking; 
democratic citizens are expected to reason from a collective point of view, 
                                                                                                                     
10 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 131–34 (2006) (detailing the “partnership” view of democracy). 
11 There is a massive literature focusing on whether citizens are up to the tasks of democratic 
citizenship. Though this question is important, it is not my focus here. For a range of views, see 
generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY 
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT (2017) (detailing how the idea of thoughtful 
citizens guiding a democratic state from the voting booth is fundamentally misguided); ROBERT 
GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003) (offering a solution when political disputes in a democracy 
invariably mix facts with values); HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, 
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY (2013) (arguing that democracy is 
legitimate, just, and smart because the decision by the many will be more accurate than decision by the 
few); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS 
SMARTER (2016) (revealing how the depths of political ignorance in America cause a major challenge 
for democracy). 
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rather than from a narrowly first-personal perspective. That is, in thinking 
through political issues, each citizen must look beyond their individual 
interests and attempt to discern the collective or public good.12 Many 
democratic theorists claim that participating in public political discussion 
is an indispensable step in adopting the collective point of view; hence 
these theorists hold that democratic citizens are also obligated to engage in 
forms of public deliberation and discussion.13 
The puzzle emerges from the fact that under conditions of intellectual 
freedom and equality, citizens’ judgments over normative matters are 
unlikely to converge. As John Rawls observed, the freedoms secured in a 
constitutional democracy give rise to a “reasonable pluralism” of political 
ideas, doctrines, perspectives, and opinions.14 Accordingly, the aim of 
public participation and deliberation is not consensus but, as indicated 
above, the achievement of a properly public perspective from which to 
form one’s political judgements and conduct political debate. Rawls’s 
insight, well-confirmed in democratic practice, is that properly public 
judgments about complex political issues nonetheless diverge.15 Hence, 
political disagreement and disputation are inexorable from democracy. 
The task of much of democratic theory is to envision and design 
processes and institutions that can manage our political divides. One might 
go as far as to say that constitutions simply are rulebooks for containing 
our divisions within the navigable boundaries of fair rules and procedures. 
But when it comes to interactions among the disputants, this managerial 
function is fraught. Although some political disagreements concern 
relatively nominal matters, many invoke citizens’ sense of justice. Though 
the familiar debates over healthcare, poverty, taxation, immigration, and 
the environment are sometimes articulated as the strictly managerial 
disputes of what the country can afford, they are ultimately disputes over 
justice, and disagreements about what a morally acceptable society is 
required to do. Hence, heat frequently accompanies these disputes. When 
arguing about matters invoking our sense of justice, we tend to see our 
interlocutors as being not merely on the incorrect side of the question, but 
on the unjust side. And when their side prevails politically, we are bound 
                                                                                                                     
12 See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95, 95–96 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) 
(explaining the importance of decisions being made collectively within a democracy, even when there 
are no shared comprehensive moral or religious views); Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Rationality and 
Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 26, 28–29 (1994) (distinguishing between 
collective good and individual interests in the democratic process). 
13 The deliberative democrats are perhaps the most obvious proponents for this kind of view. But 
the idea that citizens have a duty to discuss politics is not limited to deliberativists.  
14 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (2005).  
15 GERALD GAUS, THE TYRANNY OF THE IDEAL: JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY ch. 1 (2016).  
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to regard that outcome as not merely suboptimal or regrettable, but morally 
unacceptable. 
Here, then, is the puzzle occasioned by the popular conception of 
civility and its corresponding duty. Heated tones and antagonistic 
demeanors are precisely what one should expect in disputes where the 
interlocutors take themselves to be defending against injustice. Moreover, 
as was noted above, democratic citizens have a duty to take responsibility 
for their collective political life. Accordingly, when matters of justice are 
at stake, they are thus likely to bring to political disagreements the 
emotional and normative investments that tend to manifest in heat and 
hostility. In short, antagonism, animosity, resentment, and indignation are 
what we should expect from democratically engaged citizens when arguing 
sincerely over important public matters. The features of political discourse 
that are commonly cited as constitutive of incivility appear to be the 
natural byproducts of responsible citizenship. The duty of civility, taken in 
its popular conception, looks inconsistent with proper democratic 
citizenship. 
A defender of the popular view might retort that the reasoning above 
shows not that civility is incompatible with proper citizenship, but only 
that it is difficult. She may contend that the duty of civility is the 
requirement to contain or suppress the tendency, natural though it may be, 
to be exercised in political discussions when matters of justice are at stake. 
The duty of civility, it may be claimed, is the requirement to not allow our 
passions to get the better of us in political disputation. 
This line of defense prompts a formidable critique of the idea that the 
duty of civility involves the requirement to be soft-spoken, collected, and 
reserved in political debate. Theorists working in various feminist idioms 
have argued––correctly, in my view––that, when civility is understood 
broadly as politeness, the duty of civility gives unwarranted advantage to 
the status quo and the existing balance of political power.16 One of the 
ways in which the duty of civility so understood accomplishes this is by 
creating opportunities for the politically powerful to defuse criticisms and 
objections by fixing on the manner in which they are expressed. Those for 
whom the status quo is most objectionable tend also to be those who are 
most passionate and indignant. Consequently, the duty of civility, again 
                                                                                                                     
16 See, e.g., Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, 13 CAN. J. PHIL. 
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 111–37 (1987), reprinted in SCIENCE, MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY 209, 
213–14 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987) (noting that women were not “expected to demand 
equal rights”); Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 120, 122–24 (Seyla 
Benhabib ed., 1996) (arguing that “differences of speech privilege correlate with other differences of 
social privilege”); Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 348–49 (1997) 
(arguing that “appeals to deliberation do nothing to challenge an undesirable status quo” and ultimately 
disadvantage individuals “who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions”). 
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assuming the popular understanding of civility that we have been 
exploring, is in effect an instrument by which democratic responsibility is 
deflected and democratic judgment disabled. Once again, given the popular 
understanding of civility, the duty of civility seems incompatible with 
responsible democratic citizenship.  
This provides a clue as to what civility and its corresponding duty 
cannot be. Whatever value there might be in remaining calm and collected 
in the midst of political disagreement, it cannot be a requirement of 
democratic citizenship to do so. It may be an effective strategy to manifest 
a reserved and dispassionate demeanor in political discussion, but it is not 
a democratic duty to do so. The heat, tone, and animosity of contemporary 
political discourse might be regrettable for a variety of reasons, but it does 
not itself constitute a failure of citizenship. Consequently, the duty of 
civility requires something else of us. 
To be clear, civility in the popular sense that we have thus far adopted 
nonetheless captures a common collection of pro tanto norms which I do 
not take the arguments above to impugn. Moreover, I take it that there is a 
pro tanto duty that applies to persons to be civil in their interactions, and 
perhaps especially their disputes. The argument thus far has fixed only on 
the idea that civility, as it is popularly construed, is the core of a duty of 
citizenship. Accordingly, the upshot thus far may be formulated as follows: 
Civility is not a unitary concept. Rather, there is a distinct sense of civility 
that applies strictly to contexts of democratic politics, and consequently, a 
duty of civility that applies to persons specifically in their role as 
democratic citizens. 
II. CIVILITY AS CIVIC ADDRESS 
What, then, does this distinctively democratic concept of civility and 
its corresponding duty amount to? In pursuing this, we can draw further a 
lesson from the feminist line of criticism introduced above. Recall that the 
target of that critique was a conception of the duty of civility that too easily 
enabled powerholders and advocates of the status quo to deflect objections 
from those who find the status quo unacceptable. Widening the focus 
slightly, we can see the feminist critique as emphasizing a crucial feature 
of democratic responsibility: in order to realize the ideal of 
self-government among equals who take ownership of their collective 
political order, citizens must be accountable to one another. When it comes 
to citizens who are also holders of public office, this means that they must 
render themselves vulnerable to the criticisms of their fellow citizens. 
Broadly, democratic citizens owe to one another actual engagement; in 
conducting their political disputes, they must address one another in a way 
that is consistent with their standing as democratic citizens, that is, as 
political equals. 
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Addressing another person in a way that is consistent with their 
standing as an equal citizen is not easy, especially when matters of justice 
are at stake. Just as it is easy to manifest hostility towards those who one 
perceives to be advocating injustice, it is easy to dismiss one’s political 
opponents as political inferiors. However, unlike expressions of political 
hostility, attitudes of political superiority are obviously at odds with the 
core democratic ideal of self-government among equals. In other words, 
the political disputation that is inexorable from––because it is constitutive 
of–– democracy is always disputation among equals. I want to propose, 
then, that the core of civility (now taken in its distinctive democratic sense) 
is the norm of addressing political interlocutors as one’s fellow citizens, 
and thus as equal partners in self-government. In short, I propose that we 
think of civility as a norm of civic address, and the corresponding duty as 
requiring that we address our fellow citizens in a way that is consistent 
with their standing as our equals. 
Central to civility as civic address are three broad requirements. First, 
there is responsiveness. In political discourse, including of course 
argumentation, citizens must strive to be responsive to their interlocutors’ 
actually stated views and reasons, rather than with strawmen or other 
opportunistically constructed fabrications. Second, is the requirement of 
connection. That is, in political discourse, citizens must strive to address 
their contributions to one another, rather than to onlooking audiences or a 
choir of sympathetic partisans; in argumentative contexts, interlocutors 
must not use one another as mere props, foils against which to mug to their 
allies in the audience. Third, citizens must endeavor to conduct their 
political discourse by means of reasons and considerations that they 
sincerely believe that their interlocutors will appreciate the force of. Call 
this the mutuality requirement for civic address. In short, in communicative 
and argumentative exchanges, we manifest a due recognition for our 
interlocutor’s status as an equal when we strive to address them in a way 
that responds to their actual views, connects with them directly, and 
attempts sincerely to offer reasons and considerations that they will accept 
as such. Insofar as democratic citizenship involves a standing requirement 
to acknowledge our fellow citizens as our political equals, there is a duty of 
civility. 
Readers will have noticed that the requirements of civic address have 
been formulated as requirements to strive and endeavor to engage with 
one’s fellow citizens in a particular way. The formulation as requirements 
to try is necessary if we are to take due account of the fact that 
argumentative discourse is one of the ways in which citizens come to learn 
about their oppositions’ perspectives and arguments. Consequently, civility 
must be consistent with a certain degree of sincere misunderstanding of 
others’ views. Consider that it should not count as uncivil when a citizen 
fails to offer her interlocutors reasons that they could accept due to her 
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being honestly mistaken about the substance of their position. Borrowing a 
term proposed in a different context by Christopher Eberle, we can say that 
the resulting duty of civility is a duty of “conscientious engagement.”17 
It is not difficult to discern some of the leading merits of this approach 
to conceptualizing civility and its corresponding duty. For example, on the 
civic address account, the mark of incivility does not lie in tone, heat, or 
demeanor, but rather in opportunistic refusals to take one’s critics or 
opponents as nonetheless one’s equal citizens. And this view enables us to 
identify popular modes of political discourse as especially uncivil. Note 
how often political argumentation involves strategic mischaracterization of 
the oppositions’ actual views, the mere pantomime of answering objections 
while simply restating one’s views for the sake of rallying one’s allies, and 
the tactic of offering as decisive reasons in favor of one’s views claims that 
are the very ones being called into question by one’s critics.18 That these 
tactics are compatible with maintaining a soft, concessive tone and polite 
demeanor indicates the limitations of the popular conception of political 
civility. 
The conception of civility as civic address is also able to accommodate 
the thought that hostility and animosity are generally regrettable features 
of our politics. After all, heat and attitude are tactics for escalating conflict, 
and when they are employed by those who are already unduly advantaged, 
they serve to diminish critics and smother criticisms. One could go so far 
as to say that the marks of incivility as popularly understood (aggression, 
name-calling, shouting, impoliteness, and the like) are reliable signals that 
civility in the sense of civic address is being breached. What matters in 
assessing a mode of discourse with respect to civility, then, is how well the 
interlocutors succeed in actually addressing one another in the relevant 
ways. Heat, animosity, and tone are consistent with civic address, even 
though they are frequently manifestations of its violation. Consequently, 
democratic citizens have a pro tanto duty to be civil in the popular sense, 
but this is parasitic on the duty to civically address their fellow citizens. 
This means that a failure to be civil in the popular sense does not itself 
constitute a failure of citizenship. 
I realize that I have barely sketched my conception of civility as civic 
address. A complete view of civility would need to include far more detail 
than can be provided here. But recall that my objective in this Article is not 
to develop a conception of civility, but rather to identify a problem that any 
viable conception of civility will confront. My contention at this juncture is 
simply that the conception of civility as civil address, along with its 
                                                                                                                     
17 CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 104 (2002). 
18 See SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, WHY WE ARGUE (AND HOW WE SHOULD): A 
GUIDE TO POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNREASON 10–12 (2d ed. 2019) (offering detailed 
analyses of these pathologies). 
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corresponding duty, is both commonsensical and noncontroversial enough 
to serve as a template from which more detailed articulations of civility 
would proceed. Spelling out the details of civility as civic address is 
undertaken in other work.19 
III. CIVILITY AS A RECIPROCAL DUTY 
Any conception of civility that takes something like civic address as its 
foundation will conceive of civility as a norm of engagement with one’s 
fellow citizens, and this will naturally entail that the duty of civility is what 
may be called a reciprocal duty.20 
To explain, some duties are first-personal while others are 
reciprocal.21 An analogy with garden-variety moral virtue will be helpful. 
Consider a virtue like moderation. This virtue establishes a standard of 
conduct that requires an individual’s temperance in the pursuit of 
enjoyment. This standard is first-personal.22 What it requires is not 
contingent on the presence of other temperate people; the virtue of 
temperance applies to individuals as individuals, and demands of them 
individual moderation, even in the presence of immoderate company. 
Another example of a first-personal virtue is courage. The courageous 
person must stand firm in fearful situations, even when surrounded by 
cowards. To be sure, precisely what course of action courage requires 
might depend on one’s company and what they are currently doing; 
nonetheless, that others are cowards does not license anything less than 
courage from the courageous person. Again, courage, as a first-personal 
virtue, applies to the individual. 
Now contrast these first-personal virtues with requirements of a 
different kind. These do not primarily attach to individuals, but instead 
govern groups of individuals or are exhibited in relations between them. 
That is, they establish a standard of conduct for us rather than simply for 
me and you. For example, we teach our children the policy “keep your 
hands to yourself.” But notice that the policy of keeping one’s hands to 
oneself establishes a standard of conduct for those on the playground; 
more importantly, it is in virtue of its collective application that individuals 
are bound to comply with its requirements. Consequently, when Billy 
violates the norm by grabbing Danny, and Danny retaliates, it would be 
absurd to criticize Danny for failing to keep his hands to himself. With 
Billy’s violation, the collective norm is suspended, and in extricating 
himself by pushing Billy away, Danny does not himself break the rule. To 
                                                                                                                     
19 SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN A POLARIZED AGE 53–56 
(forthcoming 2020). 
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better capture this, notice that the norm “keep your hands to yourself” is an 
abbreviated version of the more complex norm “keep your hands to 
yourself on the condition that others are keeping their hands to 
themselves.” We see, then, that the norm and its corresponding duty are 
reciprocal; they establish a standard of conduct that applies to groups, and 
individuals are required to abide by the norm, as long as others generally 
do so as well.23 
Notice that in this playground case, the norm does not indicate what 
one is permitted to do in response to its violation. Surely there are certain 
retaliatory acts that Danny could perform against Billy that would be 
inappropriate or even impermissible. That Billy’s violation suspends the 
collective norm does not afford to Danny moral carte blanche to respond 
however he wishes. Though his retaliatory response does not itself 
constitute a violation of the “keep your hands to yourself” norm, Danny 
may still retaliate in ways that render him worthy of criticism, perhaps 
even punishment. 
Return now to politics. It is clear that some political duties are 
first-personal. As a citizen, one’s engagements with others must manifest 
the requirements of honesty and evenhandedness. That one’s fellow 
citizens are inveterate dissemblers does not license one to be dishonest or 
biased. In fact, when dishonesty is widespread, honesty and 
evenhandedness are all the more important. However, other political duties 
are reciprocal. They prescribe modes of conduct to us—collectively, so to 
speak. Accordingly, individuals are required to abide by these 
requirements only when they are embraced and generally practiced by the 
group. Where the norm corresponding to a reciprocal duty is commonly 
disregarded within a group, the duty itself is rendered inactive, as it 
establishes a standard of behavior only under the conditions where the 
norm is collectively embraced. 
Given that the duty of civility follows from the democratic aspiration 
of maintaining responsibility for the citizens’ shared political order, it 
looks clearly reciprocal. We are required to hold ourselves politically 
accountable to our fellow citizens, and hence to render ourselves 
vulnerable to their criticisms, as a way of manifesting our recognition of 
their status as equal partners in democratic self-government. When others 
are disposed to incivility, they decline to hold themselves politically 
accountable to us; under such conditions, it would be perverse to take 
ourselves to nonetheless be bound by the duty of civility. Indeed, abiding 
by the duty of civility when it is generally flouted is tantamount to abetting 
our own political subordination, as it places constraints on our political 
activity and puts our views and objectives at a relative disadvantage. One 
                                                                                                                     
23 Id. 
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might say, then, that abiding by the duty of civility under conditions where 
it is not reciprocally practiced helps to empower and entrench incivility, 
which in turn serves to further deteriorate democratic conditions. In 
abiding by the duty of civility when dealing with the uncivil, we contribute 
to the strategic effectiveness of incivility. Under certain extreme 
circumstances, there may be a duty of incivility.24 
IV. CIVILITY AS A SECOND-ORDER NORM 
The next stage of the argument begins from a brief digression into 
what might seem to be exceedingly distant territory—the views of the 
twentieth century American empiricist philosopher Willard Van Orman 
Quine, who wrote nothing in political philosophy and only one curious 
essay in moral philosophy.25 Our present interest in Quine is limited to a 
particular bit of nomenclature—specifically, the term semantic ascent26—
that he introduced as he was theorizing the structure of philosophical 
disagreements over what might be called ontology, or disagreements over 
what exists.27 I suspect readers are familiar with certain longstanding 
philosophical disputes that belong to the subfield of metaphysics. In 
particular, there is a debate going back to at least the Presocratics about 
whether everything that exists is physical.28 This is closely related to a 
debate over whether everything that exists has causal properties. Typically, 
these debates focus on the seemingly indispensable nature of certain 
abstracta (that is, nonphysical items), such as numbers, sets, classes, and 
kinds, whose role in the causal order is on anyone’s view mysterious.29 
Quine was concerned with whether disputes over the existence of such 
(purported) items could be well-ordered. It would seem that between the 
physicalist (who denies that there are abstracta) and the nonphysicalist 
(who affirms that some abstracta exist), there could be no proper 
                                                                                                                     
24 See generally CANDICE DELMAS, A DUTY TO RESIST: WHEN DISOBEDIENCE SHOULD BE 
UNCIVIL (2018) for a similar discussion in the context of the duty to obey the law. Delmas argues that 
in cases where the political order is significantly unjust, there is not only no duty to obey the law, but 
possibly a duty to disobey, perhaps even in ways that overtly violate norms of civil disobedience. Id. at 
224–25.  
25 For a reliable overview of Quine’s philosophy, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, 
QUINE: LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALITY 50–53 (1988) (describing Quine’s views on 
pragmatism, relativism, and realism). 
26 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 270–74 (1960) [hereinafter QUINE, WORD 
AND OBJECT]. 
27 See HOOKWAY, supra note 25, at 20 (“Quine speaks of the set of objects which a speaker takes 
to exist as his ‘ontology’: an assertion ‘ontologically commits’ its author to objects of a certain kind if 
the assertion would only be true if objects of that kind existed.”).  
28 See JONATHAN BARNES, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS (1979) (describing various ideas of 
the Presocratics). 
29 For an example, see generally, Kathrin Koslicki, On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements 
in Ontology, 71 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 85 (2007). 
 
2021] SEMANTIC DESCENT 1163 
engagement, as the argumentative maneuvers from the one side seem 
destined to appear question-begging to the other.30 Indeed, it seems that 
among these interlocutors, their disagreement is likely to extend to the 
question over what should count even as a relevant consideration with 
respect to the dispute. 
Quine gave the name semantic ascent to the strategy of dealing with 
disputes of this kind by shifting the site of the dispute, at least 
momentarily, towards the terms each side employs in formulating their 
position; interlocutors should try ascending from talking about the matter 
in dispute to talking about the way they talk about the matter in dispute. 
Quine writes that semantic ascent “is the shift from talking in certain terms 
to talking about them.”31 He reasons that “[w]ords . . . unlike [e.g.] classes . 
. . are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men 
of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best.”32 
The strategy of semantic ascent, then, is that of looking for relatively 
uncontested common ground, in the hope that disputants might find some 
foothold from which to more productively conduct their more fundamental 
disagreements. Importantly, the strategy involves not simply a change in 
the topic of the disputants’ conversation, but a shift in the level of the topic 
of the conversation. They are to shift from arguing about, e.g., whether 
classes exist to talking about how they talk about whether classes exist. 
This second-order conversation will focus on hopefully more tractable 
questions such as what each takes to be adequate definitions or 
conceptualizations of the disputed items, what renders those definitions 
and conceptualizations adequate, and so on. 
Again, the hope is that by ascending to semantic level, interlocutors 
might discover that there is enough difference in their nomenclature as to 
render their dispute over classes merely verbal. (In that case, they may 
nonetheless have to confront a prolonged debate at the semantic level.) Or 
they could discover that they are largely in agreement over the semantics, 
which itself might constitute a kind of progress in their first-order dispute 
about classes. Semantic ascent, then, is not a way to resolve disputes, but 
rather a means for making disputes more orderly. 
Semantic ascent is of course a commonsense strategy that we 
intuitively employ in disputes of all kinds. What is of particular interest at 
present is that the strategy calls attention to a general fact of 
disagreements, namely that they run simultaneously along two evaluative 
tracks that may be distinguished by referring to first-order and 
second-order levels of evaluation. In this way, argumentation functions a 
                                                                                                                     
30 See generally Jody Azzouni, On “On What There Is”, 79 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 1 (1998) (discussing 
“debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis”). 
31 QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 271. 
32 Id. at 272. 
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lot like communication more generally. More specifically, in order to carry 
on a conversation, communicators must simultaneously track two distinct 
levels of language use, namely the meanings of the words being used (the 
semantics, the first order) and the grammatical structure in which they are 
used (the syntax, the second order). Missteps in tracking either distinct 
level typically result in communicative failure.33 What is more, 
communicators need a common second-order idiom in order to diagnose 
and correct certain kinds of communicative failure. 
Similarly, in order to successfully engage in argumentation, disputants 
must track and evaluate each other’s claims (the first order) as well as what 
might be called their argumentative performance (the second order). For 
example, when engaged in argumentation about, say, gun ownership laws, 
disputants must be able to track one another’s first-order claims about 
guns, ownership, and the law, while also attending to the ways in which 
those claims figure into the evolving dialectic among them. Minimally, in 
order to engage in argumentation, each interlocutor’s contribution must: 
take account of the relevant prior statements introduced into the discussion; 
avoid contradicting their own prior statements; refrain from needlessly 
repeating claims that are already manifestly agreed upon; decline to 
repeatedly assert as a premise that which is disputed among them; and so 
on. In other words, interlocutors must perpetually be “keeping score” of 
the state of play in their disagreement.34 This is a second-order evaluative 
site that is accordingly distinct from the first-order assessment of the 
reasons offered about gun ownership laws. Accordingly, just as an unsound 
argument can have a true conclusion, an impeccable first-order case for 
stricter gun laws can be a dialectical failure. 
We are now able to tie the hanging threads together. As a collection of 
norms governing our engagement with fellow citizens in political 
disagreements, civility as civic address has largely to do with what has just 
been called our argumentative performance. We fail to be civil not simply 
                                                                                                                     
33 This is not intended as a complete analysis of communication, but only as identifying two 
necessary conditions for communicative success. Command of the relevant semantics and syntax does 
not suffice for successful communication; according to many views, one must also develop an adequate 
conception of the interlocutor’s communicative intention in talking as she does. See PAUL GRICE, 
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989) (formulating “the Cooperative Principle” for participants in 
conversation: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”).  
34 David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339, 344–46 (1979). See 
also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE 
COMMITMENT 6 (1994) (explaining an aim of the work is “to address the question, How should the 
relation between representation . . . and the discursive concepts of reason and truth be understood?”); 
MARY KATE MCGOWAN, JUST WORDS: ON SPEECH AND HIDDEN HARM 2 (2019) (identifying “a 
previously overlooked mechanism by which ordinary speech by ordinary speakers under ordinary 
circumstances enacts harmful norms and thus constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. Harm is 
constituted when the harm is brought about via adherence to norms enacted”). 
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in virtue of the position we hold, nor simply in virtue of the heat or tone 
with which we express our position, but centrally in virtue of the ways in 
which our presentation of our position fails to properly address our 
interlocutor. In this sense, civility is a second-order norm, and the 
corresponding duty is similarly second order—it is a duty to engage 
political disagreement in a particular way. In short, the duty of civility has 
to do with our dialectal conduct. 
The second-order nature of civility may seem so obvious as to not 
require extended comment. However, it is worth emphasizing this feature 
of the duty in order to properly understand its role in democratic life. The 
concept of civility is needed to articulate a feasible understanding of what 
citizens owe to one another, given that political disagreement is an 
inevitable product of democracy itself. That is, democratic citizens need to 
be able to evaluate one another’s dialectical conduct as a way of managing 
their first-order disputes. As with the ontological debates that concerned 
Quine, citizens need to be able to talk about the way they talk about the 
issues that divide them, as this second-order talk can help them to arrive at 
mutually agreeable understandings of where their disagreements lie and the 
precise shape they take. Perhaps the ability to ascend to talk in the second 
order about how well one’s arguments address one’s interlocutors can 
sometimes assist in making progress with first-order disputes over policy. 
At the very least, the ability to avail ourselves of a second-order idiom for 
evaluating discursive conduct may be able to help prevent undue escalation 
in contexts of disagreement. 
And here is where a point made at the beginning of this Article comes 
into its own. Note that the idiom of civility can perform these democratic 
tasks only if it is second order. That is, a conception of civility can play its 
proper role in democracy only if it specifies requirements that can be met 
by those who hold erroneous political views, and also violated by those 
who hold correct political views. We might say that the requirements 
specified by the duty of civility must be nonpartisan, that is, impartial with 
respect to political error and correctness. Or, put another way, a viable 
conception of civility and its corresponding duty must enable us to 
countenance cases where those with whom we agree at the first order are 
nonetheless failing at civility, and those with whom we disagree at the first 
order are nonetheless civil.  
V. THE PROBLEM OF SEMANTIC DESCENT 
My hope is that nearly everything that has been said thus far strikes the 
reader as unobjectionable, perhaps even commonsensical. Still, the 
elements are in place for formulating what I see as a serious difficulty 
confronting any plausible conception of civility. When it comes to political 
disagreement, there are no analogues to Quine’s “tangible objects” that 
allow people “of unlike conceptual schemes” to “communicate at their 
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best.”35 To put the point bluntly, what goes up can come down, too. And 
our second-order idiom for evaluating each other’s discursive conduct is 
subject to what can be called semantic descent—the shift by which our 
second-order evaluative terms are conscripted into playing a combat role in 
first-order skirmishes. 
To get the flavor of what I have in mind, consider a term used in 
talking about online discourse: “troll.” This term entered into our 
vernacular as a way to identify a mode of online conduct that is 
objectionable in virtue of being provocative and haranguing simply for the 
sake of disrupting discussion threads.36 In this original usage, being a 
“troll” has little to do with one’s substantive commitments; “trolling” is the 
second-order phenomenon of engaging in a way designed to derail 
conversation. Once the term gained currency, however, it quickly became 
vulnerable to semantic descent: the term is now widely deployed as a term 
of abuse to characterize those with whom one disagrees over issues at the 
first order. “Trolls” are simply one’s political opponents, and “trolling” is 
what trolls (so understood) do in articulating their views. 
Another example of the phenomenon of semantic descent is the term 
“fake news.” The term was introduced to describe a source that poses as 
journalistic, but in fact is not.37 The term thus initially denoted a 
second-order feature of various web sites, television programs, and print 
media. However, “fake news” is now widely used as a term to deride the 
content that is reported by a journalist.38 At its worst, “fake news” is 
simply what one calls reportage that is favorable to one’s political rivals.39 
In this way, the term has descended from its second-order function to our 
first-order debates. In other words, it initially served an umpiring function, 
but is now just another player in the political game. 
Finally, consider the verb to “politicize.” This term entered the 
vernacular as a way of identifying cases where political actors attempt to 
gain politically from a high-profile event (typically a tragedy) that arguably 
ought to stand above the fray of politics. But now the term is itself 
                                                                                                                     
35 QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 272. 
36 ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST., MEDIA MANIPULATION AND 
DISINFORMATION ONLINE 4–5 (2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf. 
37 JULIE POSETTI ET AL., JOURNALISM, ‘FAKE NEWS’ & DISINFORMATION: HANDBOOK FOR 
JOURNALISM EDUCATION AND TRAINING 14 (2018). This book references the “growing international 
concern about a ‘disinformation war’ in which journalism and journalists are prime targets,” and offers 
as evidence the joint statement issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Id.  
38 Id. at 66. 
39 Id. at 14–15. 
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deployed as a means for gaining politically under circumstances of that 
kind. More specifically, the term functions as an accusation that one wields 
against one’s opposition as a way to claim for oneself the political high 
ground by disparaging one’s rivals. But, of course, vying for the political 
high ground is itself an attempt to gain politically. 
The trouble is that any conceptualization of civility, and indeed the 
very concept of civility itself, is subject to semantic descent. That is, 
although civility is useful to us as a way of thinking about how we conduct 
ourselves in political argumentation, it can always be opportunistically 
wielded as just another way of carrying out our first-order debates. When 
civility has descended, it functions as a term of approval for those who 
express positions that we find favorable, and incivility serves as a term for 
expressing disapprobation at the first-order positions that we find 
objectionable. 
The matter grows bleaker still once we recall that civility norms are 
best understood as requirements to try to engage in ways that successfully 
address one’s fellow citizens. This means that the question of whether a 
citizen is being civil in a particular dispute is largely a matter of judgment: 
we must assess whether our interlocutor is endeavoring adequately to 
address us as an equal and communicating in good faith. A significant 
body of empirical literature demonstrates that evaluations of this kind are 
highly responsive to exogeneous factors. In short, we are very likely to 
regard those with whom we disagree politically as ill-motivated, 
untrustworthy, and unreliable. Accordingly, our assessments of their 
dialectical conduct will be responsive to our evaluations of their first-order 
views in ways that will lead us to assess our opponents as uncivil. 
Recall the argument from Section Three that the duty of civility is a 
reciprocal requirement. This means that individual citizens are bound by 
the requirement only provided that their interlocutors seem prepared to 
reciprocate. Once civility has descended from its second-order function, 
we grow increasingly unable to regard our political rivals as capable of 
reciprocating. We therefore take ourselves to not be bound by civility’s 
norms. Crucially, our opposition reasons similarly. The result is 
democratically degenerative—a condition where citizens are able to 
interact civilly only with those who are politically just like themselves, 
and, with some justification, see those who are politically different as 
undeserving of civility (because unwilling or unable to reciprocate). 
CONCLUSION 
Return to the Pew results mentioned at the beginning of this Article. 
Citizens say they want a more civil mode of politics, but they also see their 
political opposition as the source of incivility, and accordingly want their 
rivals simply to stand down and acquiesce. This collection of attitudes is 
precisely what we should expect when civility has semantically descended, 
 
1168 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
when its second-order content has been degraded to the point where it can 
no longer serve as a basis for impartial evaluation of discursive conduct. 
The upshot, I think, is that the concept of civility is at this point probably 
unable to play a useful role in diagnosing and repairing our democracy. To 
put the point in a different way, no suitably detailed conception of civility 
will be sufficiently public and impartial to serve as a tool for addressing 
our political dysfunctions. 
Where does that leave us? Although I cannot develop the thought here, 
my sense is that the partisanship, animosity, polarization, and distrust that 
have taken hold of our democracy cannot be remedied with prescriptions 
for better politics. Any such prescription is likely to be received by a large 
portion of those to whom it is addressed as yet another partisan maneuver. 
What is needed instead is the recognition that these dysfunctions are 
possibly the natural result of allowing politics to play too great a role in our 
collective life. As other scholars have noted, the intensification of partisan 
animosity and polarization has occurred alongside sociological shifts in the 
country that have served to place individuals’ partisan affiliations at the 
center of their social identity. In short, we now tend to see ourselves as 
fundamentally defined by our political loyalties.40 Along with this shift in 
our self-understanding has come a transformation of the social spaces we 
inhabit in our day-to-day lives: they have become increasingly segregated 
along partisan divides.41 Perhaps the right response, then, is to devise 
channels by which citizens can come to see in one another something 
beyond partisan identities. As paradoxical as it might sound, the way to 
repair our democracy is to keep ourselves mindful of the fact that, as 
important as democracy is, we cannot live well together as equals solely by 
means of politics.42 
                                                                                                                     
40 See LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 5–6 
(2018) (“Parties simplify the voting decision. . . . [M]ost voters have a sense of party loyalty. They 
know, either through a lifetime of learning, from parental socialization, from news media, or through 
some combination thereof, that one party is better suited to them.”).  
41 See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS 
TEARING US APART 5 (2009) (“As Americans have moved over the past three decades, they have 
clustered in communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end, 
politics. . . . When people move, they also make choices about who their neighbors will be and who 
will share their new lives. Those are now political decisions, and they are having a profound effect on 
the nation’s public life.”). 
42 See ROBERT B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST PUT POLITICS IN ITS 
PLACE 4–5 (2019) (discussing “the ubiquity of democratic politics, the saturation of social life with 
activities and projects that are overtly organized around the categories and divisions of current 
politics”). 
